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To assess and manage reputational risks associated with supply chains, buyers are increasingly 
seeking information about their suppliers’ labor and environmental performance. Several 
voluntary programs have arisen to encourage suppliers to report this information in a standardized 
manner, but the information companies report might misrepresent their performance and can thus 
mislead rather than inform buyers. We hypothesize particular circumstances in which buyers can 
screen suppliers based on their participation in voluntary programs requiring public commitments 
and public reporting. In particular, we theorize that stakeholder scrutiny can effectively deter 
companies with misrepresentative disclosures from participating in such programs, and that this 
deterrence effect is stronger for smaller companies and in institutional contexts featuring stronger 
activist pressures and stronger norms of corporate transparency. Examining the decisions of 2,043 
firms headquartered in 42 countries of whether to participate in the UN Global Compact, we find 
support for these hypotheses.  
  
1. Introduction 
Companies are increasingly being held accountable for their suppliers’ labor and environmental 
performance and face substantial reputational risk when problems are revealed. For example, Apple’s 
reputation suffered after harsh working conditions were exposed at Foxconn, one of its key suppliers in 
China. After being accused by Greenpeace campaigns of sourcing from suppliers that were contributing 
to deforestation, reputational concerns led McDonald’s, Unilever, and Proctor & Gamble to implement 
new policies and procedures to avoid sourcing from such suppliers (Greenpeace International 2009a, 
2009b, 2014). 
Obtaining a representative portrayal of suppliers’ labor and environmental performance can help 
buyers avoid such surprises and assess the full economic costs of their sourcing options. A supplier 
offering the lowest prices might not be the lowest-cost supplier in the long run if its poor labor and 
environmental performance leads to negative publicity for the buyer. Moreover, obtaining this 
information better enables buyers to respond to the increasing demands they face from customers, 2 
 
regulators, and investors for information about their suppliers’ labor and environmental performance.
1 
But obtaining this kind of information can be very costly, and it has often been difficult for buyers to 
discern whether the information disclosed by suppliers is representative of their overall performance or 
simply a form of greenwashing that disproportionately discloses favorable aspects of their performance 
(Lyon and Maxwell 2010, Delmas and Burbano 2011, Bowen 2014, Marquis and Toffel 2014).  
In this paper, we demonstrate how supplier participation in a particular type of voluntary program 
can serve as a useful mechanism for buyers to screen suppliers. We show how the risk of attracting 
stakeholder scrutiny upon joining such a program imposes an indirect cost of participation that is larger 
for “misrepresentative” suppliers—those whose prior disclosures emphasize relatively benign aspects 
while cloaking the more harmful aspects. This approach adds to several conventional options buyers face 
when seeking to assess reputational risk from potential suppliers. For example, buyers can look for 
suppliers that have become certified to third-party standards governing quality management (e.g., ISO 
9001), environmental management (e.g., ISO 14000), occupational health and safety (e.g., OHSAS 
18000), and labor issues (e.g., SA8000) (Corbett, Montes-Sancho, and Kirsch 2005, King, Lenox, and 
Terlaak 2005, Potoski and Prakash 2005, Terlaak and King 2006, Levine and Toffel 2010; Gray, Anand, 
and Roth forthcoming).
2 Drawbacks of this approach include the expense of engaging external auditors 
(Darnall and Edwards 2006), the existence of poorly trained and ineffective auditors (O’Rourke 2002, 
                                                      
1 For example, customers are increasingly demanding comprehensive environmental information about products to 
identify which ones have a truly “green” lifecycle and companies publicly traded on U.S. exchanges face regulations 
requiring them to publicly disclose whether particular minerals they procure might have originated from military 
conflict zones (Ernst & Young 2010, Lynch and Hurley 2014). After the collapse of Rana Plaza in April 2013, 
investors at Calvert Investments wrote to the CEOs of several major brands to encourage them “to increase 
disclosure regarding their supply chains” (Calvert Investment Management 2013). 
2 These studies posit that suppliers (a) adopt these standards to signal to buyers that they have met a particular 
performance threshold and (b) hire independent auditors to certify to their adherence. Such standards can serve as a 
signal to buyers because the direct costs of obtaining the certification are larger for “low quality” suppliers, which 
often do not already possess the skills and management systems required. Just as a third-party certified standard can 
be used by a supplier as a credible signal of the suppliers’ quality, it can also be used in a buyer’s procurement 
policy as a credible screen of the suppliers’ quality. Other studies have examined the buyer’s perspective and argue, 
consistent with screening theory, that buyers—uninformed about suppliers’ actual behavior and performance—can 
screen or select suppliers based on the suppliers’ adoption of certified management standards (Corbett and Kirsch 
2001, Albuquerque, Bronnenberg, and Corbett 2007, Delmas and Montiel 2009, Arimura, Darnall, and Katayama 
2011). 3 
 
Locke, Qin, and Brause 2007, Heras-Saizarbitoria and Boiral 2013), and the disconnect between the 
standards’ focus on management practices and the buyers’ desire to screen suppliers based on their 
performance.  
Buyers can also attempt to screen suppliers based on their voluntary self-disclosures of labor and 
environmental performance. Buyers could, for example, seek to assess reputational risks associated with a 
particular supplier by using the information in that supplier’s corporate sustainability reports, annual 
reports, and reports submitted to voluntary programs that require public reporting.
3 Such information is 
challenging to gather and compare (Jira and Toffel 2013). Whereas some suppliers disclose their labor 
and environmental performance to inform buyers, others strategically disclose relatively benign aspects of 
their performance to draw attention from what they want to hide. These problems make it difficult for 
buyers seeking to rely on suppliers’ information disclosures to assess the reputational risk of sourcing 
from them.
4 Suppliers’ participation in a voluntary reporting program can be a useful additional screening 
mechanism for buyers seeking suppliers that make representative disclosures as long as suppliers that 
make misrepresentative disclosures are deterred from participating. But in fact, voluntary reporting 
programs typically lack precertification requirements and, to foster learning, encourage companies to join 
irrespective of their prior performance. Previous research has shown that programs lacking a third-party 
certification requirement tend to attract companies with poor social and environmental performance (e.g., 
King and Lenox 2000, Lenox and Nash 2003, Rivera and de Leon 2004).  
We examine a class of voluntary reporting programs that we refer to as “commit-and-report” 
programs: those that require participants to publicly commit to eventually meet the program’s objectives 
and to publicly report their future labor and environmental performance. Examples of commit-and-report 
                                                      
3 Darnall and Carmin (2005) refer to programs with a reporting requirement as “voluntary reporting programs” and 
found more than 65 in the United States alone. 
4 The Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) recognizes the problem that much of the social and/or 
environmental information disclosed is misrepresentative. The organization has recently begun trying to address this 
by developing standards to provide “a comprehensive view of a corporation’s sustainability risks. However, the 
standards for many sectors are still being developed and those that have been developed were done so with a focus 
on the needs of U.S. publicly owned companies (SASB 2014).  4 
 
programs include the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) 33/50 Program (Arora and Cason 
1996; Khanna and Damon 1999), U.S. EPA’s Performance Track and state agency versions of that 
program (Coglianese and Nash 2014), the ski industry’s Sustainable Slopes, and the United Nations 
Global Compact. Upon joining, a participant’s public commitment invites scrutiny from stakeholders 
ranging from activist groups to investors to the general public. Stakeholders may be concerned that 
companies that join and subsequently submit misrepresentative reports might gain unwarranted benefits 
(e.g., gaining extra sales, attracting higher quality employees, or generally increasing corporate 
reputation) by creating a misleadingly positive perception of their performance. To correct that false 
perception, stakeholders can examine past labor and/or environmental disclosures to expose past 
misrepresentation so as to undermine the perceived benefits of joining the program.  
We therefore propose that companies that have made misrepresentative disclosures in the past 
will be especially unlikely to join a commit-and-report program when the institutional and organizational 
contexts increase the threat of stakeholder scrutiny. Specifically, we hypothesize that firms with a history 
of misrepresentative disclosures will be especially deterred from joining a commit-and-report program 
when they are headquartered in countries that feature stronger pressures from civil society and that 
possess stronger norms of corporate transparency. Moreover, we hypothesize that smaller firms with a 
history of misrepresentative disclosure will be especially deterred from participating in a commit-and-
report program because the resulting scrutiny will have a more pronounced effect on them than it does on 
larger firms that already tend to be more visible. We test and find empirical support for our hypotheses in 
the context of 2,043 companies’ decisions of whether to join the UN Global Compact, a commit-and-
report program that has attracted more than 10,000 participating organizations in 130 countries (UN 
Global Compact 2014a).  
Our findings make several contributions to the literature. While the literature on supply chain 
screening mechanisms had concluded that only programs with an independent certification requirement 
could serve as a credible screen, we provide the first empirical evidence that, under certain circumstances, 
buyers can screen suppliers based on their participation in voluntary programs that lack an independent 5 
 
certification requirement. In particular, we show how the risk of stakeholder scrutiny imposes an indirect 
cost of participation that can deter misrepresentative suppliers from joining. We also contribute to the 
literature on information sharing between suppliers and buyers, which highlights the circumstances under 
which such sharing is more likely to occur (Li 2002, Li and Lin 2006, Li and Zhang 2008, Özer, Zheng, 
and Chen 2011, Jira and Toffel 2013), but had not examined how buyers might acquire more 
representative information from their suppliers.  
2.  Theory and Hypotheses 
We posit that certain suppliers face implicit costs of joining commit-and-report programs.  
Publicly committing to a program’s labor and environmental objectives and to future public reporting 
invite increased stakeholder scrutiny of a firm’s labor and environmental performance. This increased 
scrutiny—when it results in positive public recognition—is a primary incentive for firms to join many 
voluntary programs (Henriques and Sadorsky 1995, Arora and Cason 1996, Rivera 2002). But such 
scrutiny poses a more serious risk for companies that had been disclosing misrepresentative information 
because this behavior provides stakeholders with more opportunities to discover and reveal previously 
hidden negative information.  
Moreover, companies whose prior disclosures are misrepresentative also face the risk of 
stakeholders discovering and criticizing their prior disclosure strategy as having sought to mislead 
stakeholders. Moreover, misrepresentative disclosers risk criticism from activists who might attempt to 
correct the misleadingly positive perception their disclosures created. For example, after activists accused 
Nike of relying on suppliers with subpar labor conditions, the company released a report that emphasized 
positive information about the state of the labor conditions but neglected to disclose information on the 
low wages that had sparked the original criticism. This misrepresentative report drew further criticism and 
scrutiny from activists, who believed that the report was meant to deflect attention from their concerns 
(Himelstein 1997). We therefore propose: 6 
 
H1: Companies with past misrepresentative disclosures are less likely to participate in a commit-
and-report program. 
2.1 Civil society scrutiny 
The deterrence effect hypothesized in H1 will vary depending on the level of scrutiny civil 
society provides. Many activist groups investigate corporate behavior and criticize subpar environmental, 
social, or governance performance and have been particularly critical of misleading disclosure (Lyon and 
Maxwell 2011). Some of the most prominent stakeholder scrutiny triggered by companies joining 
commit-and-report programs is conducted by NGOs such as Greenpeace and the Center for Research on 
Multinational Corporations that runs the Global Compact Critics website.
5 Their criticism, often 
portrayed as exposés, seeks to convince stakeholders that a company’s actions are duplicitous, with the 
ultimate goal of eroding the reputation of such companies to deter duplicitous behavior. Experimental 
evidence indicates that negative information about a company that is exposed by an external stakeholder 
(NGOs, in the experiment) elicits a more negative reaction than companies’ self-disclosure of the same 
information (Reimsbach and Hahn forthcoming).  
Civil society members tend to focus their scrutiny on companies headquartered in their own 
country, in part because transnational social movements are difficult to construct and maintain (Tarrow 
2001). Not only is it easier to research companies that operate (and release information) in their local 
language, but civil society actors can more easily educate the local community through public hearings 
(Billings 1971) and engage with the local regulators (Sine and Lee 2009). This, in turn, amplifies the 
message to the company’s senior management and shareholders, who tend to be concentrated in the 
headquarters country, and increases the likelihood of changing the company’s behavior. Being 
headquartered in a country with strong pressures from civil society has been shown to deter overall 
participation in voluntary programs, implying that companies in those countries are especially keen to 
                                                      
5 As of July 2013, Greenpeace International’s website (http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/) included 47 
articles highlighting duplicitous actions by members of Responsible Care, the chemical industry’s voluntary 
program. The Global Compact Critics website is http://globalcompactcritics.blogspot.com/.  7 
 
avoid the heightened scrutiny that participating can trigger (Kim and Lyon 2011, Berliner and Prakash 
2012). We therefore propose:  
H2: Being headquartered in a country with strong civil society scrutiny will moderate—by further 
reducing—the likelihood that companies with past misrepresentative disclosures will participate 
in a commit-and-report program.  
2.2 Institutional norms 
Countries differ widely in stakeholder expectations for corporate transparency, and companies 
headquartered in countries with stronger transparency norms face greater pressure to report more 
information on their financial, social, and environmental risks (Zarzeski 1996, Newson and Deegan 
2002). Stronger norms for transparency, which call for representative disclosure to accurately portray 
performance, coincide with less tolerance for opportunistic and misleading disclosures that could 
misinform and harm stakeholders.  
A company’s key stakeholders—including employees, regulators, and investors—tend to be 
concentrated in its headquarters country, which makes this institutional environment especially influential 
on corporate decisions (Guler, Guillén, and Macpherson 2002). Moreover, evidence suggests that 
companies tend to be more responsive to the disclosure demands of their local stakeholders than to those 
of the global community (Newson and Deegan 2002). Companies headquartered in countries with 
stronger financial reporting standards are therefore more likely to have internal and external stakeholders 
who are especially intolerant of misrepresentative disclosures, posing a heightened risk of criticism 
should misleading disclosures be revealed. We therefore propose: 
H3: Being headquartered in a country with stronger financial reporting standards will 
moderate—by further reducing—the likelihood that companies with past misrepresentative 
disclosures will participate in a commit-and-report program. 8 
 
2.3 Organizational visibility 
Companies that are more visible to their stakeholders—generally because they are larger or more 
well-known—tend to draw more stakeholder scrutiny. Larger companies are often subject to stronger 
demands from regulators and public interest groups (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, Scott 1992, Greening and 
Gray 1994) and are more often targeted by activists (Eesley and Lenox 2006). Smaller companies are less 
likely to have recognizable brands, and the public is less likely to have formed strong opinions about them 
(Fombrun, Gardberg, and Barnett 2000). Additional scrutiny brought on by joining a commit-and-report 
program is therefore less likely to reveal as much new information about a large company as it would 
about a smaller company. We therefore propose that smaller firms will be less keen to invite the 
“spotlight” of stakeholder scrutiny by participating in a commit-and-report program:  
H4: Being a smaller company will moderate—by further reducing—the likelihood that companies 
with past misrepresentative disclosures will participate in a commit-and-report program. 
3. Data and Measures 
3.1 Empirical context 
We test our hypotheses by examining participation in the Global Compact, a commit-and-report 
program launched by the United Nations in 2000 to encourage companies to address social and 
environmental concerns, especially in countries that lack strong civil and governmental institutions. The 
Global Compact requires companies to (a) make a public commitment to operate according to 10 
principles to protect human rights, worker rights, and the environment and to avoid corruption
6 and (b) to 
                                                      
6 The following are the 10 principles: “Human Rights: (1) Businesses should support and respect the protection of 
internationally proclaimed human rights; and (2) make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.  
Labour: (3) Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to 
collective bargaining; (4) the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour; (5) the effective abolition of 
child labour; and (6) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. Environment: (7) 
Businesses should support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges; (8) undertake initiatives to 
promote greater environmental responsibility; and (9) encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally 
friendly technologies. Anti-corruption: (10) Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, including 
extortion and bribery” (UN Global Compact 2013).  9 
 
commit to making an annual public report of the company’s progress in implementing the principles and 
its future plans to do so. The United Nations publicly reports the names and progress reports of all 
participants on the Global Compact website.  
The Global Compact’s minimal participation requirements have made it the world’s largest 
voluntary corporate social responsibility program, with more than 10,000 companies participating as of 
2013 (Berliner and Prakash 2012, Rasche, Waddock, and McIntosh 2013, UN Global Compact 2014a). 
But those minimal requirements have also raised concerns that the Compact accepts members that are not 
truly committed to its principles (Bigge 2004, Nolan 2005, Deva 2006, Waddock and McIntosh 2011). 
Such companies have been charged with attempting to “bluewash”—that is, to enhance their reputations 
by association with the prestige of the United Nations (and its blue flag)—in order to distract stakeholders 
from their social and environmental shortcomings (CorpWatch 2001, Williams 2004, Deva 2006).
7  
Prior research indicates that the Global Compact especially attracts participants from countries 
that invest heavily abroad, that are more supportive of the United Nations and its missions, and that have 
fewer NGOs (Bennie, Bernhagen, and Mitchell 2007, Berliner and Prakash 2012). Berliner and Prakash 
(2012) attribute the latter finding to NGOs having a negative impression of the Global Compact, 
especially its lax membership requirements. Companies from extractive industries, which are especially 
dependent on governments and local communities for permitting, are especially likely to participate, as 
are larger and more profitable companies (Bennie, Bernhagen, and Mitchell 2007).  
3.2 Sample 
Finding no data sources assessing a large global sample of companies’ disclosures across all four 
of the Global Compact’s focal topics (human rights, labor, environment, and corruption), we focus on 
                                                      
7 The activist group CorpWatch defines bluewash as occurring when companies “wrap themselves in the blue flag of 
the United Nations in order to associate themselves with UN themes of human rights, labor rights and environmental 
protection. Even companies with practices antithetical to UN values…have attempted to bluewash their image. 
Bluewash is typically associated with attempts by ‘corporate humanitarians’ to weaken UN agreements, in favor of 
voluntary, toothless codes of conduct regarding social and environmental issues” (CorpWatch 2001). For examples 
of activist blogs that charge some Global Compact participants with bluewashing, see the Global Compact Critics 
website (http://globalcompactcritics.blogspot.com/) and the Global Compact Compliance website 
(http://globalcompactcompliance.blogspot.com/). 10 
 
environmental disclosure using data from Trucost Plc.
8 Our sampling frame is defined by Trucost’s 
coverage, which is the set of 4,819 public companies that were listed on any of the following major stock 
indices during the five-year period of 2004 through 2008: ASX 200, FTSE All Share (and subsets 
including FTSE 100 and FTSE 350), MSCI All World Developed (and subsets including MSCI Europe), 
MSCI Asia ex Japan, MSCI Emerging Markets, Nikkei 225, Russell 1000, S&P 500, and S&P Emerging 
Markets.   
We exclude the 2,496 companies in service industries, for which environmental reporting is much 
less of an issue.
9 Because we focus on a firm’s decision to participate in the Global Compact, we also 
exclude the 112 companies that had already made that decision prior to our sample period. Linking the 
remaining 2,211 companies to our other data sources—the United Nations, Worldscope, the World 
Economic Forum, the World Values Survey, the Yearbook of International Organizations, and the USDA 
Economic Research Service—results in an estimation sample of 2,043 companies headquartered in 42 
countries, including 109 companies that began participating in the Global Compact during our sample 
period.  
Tables 1 and 2 report the country and industry distributions of our estimation sample.   
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 here] 
3.3 Variables 
We measure Global Compact participation as a binary variable coded 1 starting the year a 
company initially participated in the Global Compact and 0 otherwise (that is, in years prior to a 
company’s participation, and for all years of non-participants). We obtained a comprehensive list of all 
                                                      
8 Trucost Plc produces and sells corporate environmental profiles—including environmental performance and 
disclosure—to socially responsible investors. 
9Specifically, we excluded banks, financial services, healthcare, insurance, investment instruments, media, real 
estate, retail, telecommunications, travel and leisure, and the following subsectors: business support services, 
business training and employment agencies, delivery services, financial administration, marine transportation, 
railroads, transportation services, trucking, waste and disposal services, software, computer services, and Internet. 11 
 
companies that participated in the Global Compact, including the date they began participating, from the 
Global Compact website. 
Misrepresentative reports are those that disproportionately disclose less-impactful aspects of a 
company’s labor or environmental performance. Our measure of a company’s misrepresentativeness in its 
disclosures is calculated for each company-year by subtracting Trucost’s “weighted disclosure ratio” from 
its “absolute disclosure ratio” (Marquis and Toffel 2014).
10 The absolute disclosure ratio is the proportion 
of a company’s relevant environmental indicators for which the company disclosed global quantitative 
figures. Trucost identified the subset of 464 industries from which each company derived revenues each 
year, based on the FactSet Fundamentals database, financial disclosures, and company feedback. From a 
comprehensive list of environmental indicators (such as sulfur dioxide emissions and 
hydrofluourocarbons), Trucost identified the subset that it deemed relevant to each of these industries, 
based on lifecycle assessment and economic input-output tables. The total number of these distinct 
environmental indicators deemed relevant to any of the company’s industries is the denominator of the 
absolute disclosure ratio. Trucost calculated the numerator by identifying the subset of these indicators for 
which the company had publicly disclosed worldwide quantitative figures (for example, worldwide 
carbon dioxide emissions) in sources such as its annual report, sustainability report, or company website.  
The weighted disclosure ratio is similar to the absolute disclosure ratio except that it also takes 
into account the cost of the environmental damage associated with the disclosed and undisclosed 
environmental indicators. Trucost uses economic input-output data and lifecycle assessment data to 
estimate the natural resources consumed and pollution emitted per dollar of revenue for each of 464 
industries. Each quantity of resource consumption and pollution emission is multiplied by an 
environmental damage cost factor, such as $31 per ton of greenhouse gas emitted, which Trucost obtains 
from the environmental economics literature (Trucost Plc 2008). This enables Trucost to estimate the 
environmental damage cost per revenue dollar in each industry. Trucost applies these environmental cost 
                                                      
10 For a detailed description and examples, see Marquis and Toffel (2014). 12 
 
factors to each company’s annual revenue stream from each industry. The sum of these products is the 
denominator of the weighted disclosure ratio, which is also referred to as the company’s environmental 
damage. The numerator of the weighted disclosure ratio is the environmental damage cost for the subset 
of these indicators that the company publicly disclosed. Thus, a company that disclosed indicators 
associated with its less damaging indicators but did not disclose its more damaging indicators will have 
an absolute disclosure ratio larger than its weighted disclosure ratio and therefore a positive 
misrepresentativeness score. This measure assesses the extent to which the environmental information a 
company discloses is representative of its environmental impacts.
11 Disclosing many minor indicators but 
few if any major ones (higher misrepresentativeness) can yield a false impression of transparency, a tactic 
that companies can use to misdirect stakeholders’ attention (Marquis and Toffel 2014). 
The Global Compact notes that civil society organizations can participate in the Global Compact 
to hold participants accountable to their commitments to implement the Global Compact’s principles, 
which provides us with an indicator of the extent to which company participants will be subject to civil 
society scrutiny. We measure civil society scrutiny as the number of global civil society organizations that 
were members of the Global Compact in each company’s headquarters country in a given year. We 
obtained this measure from the Global Compact website, which defines civil society organizations as 
NGOs and nonprofit entities that pursue positive social and environmental changes (UN Global Compact 
2014b).  
We measure the strength of financial reporting standards for a company’s headquarters country 
based on data from the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness annual survey (Johnson, 
                                                      
11 For example, suppose a company has just three relevant environmental indicators (greenhouse gas and sulfur 
dioxide emissions and arsenic effluent), releases 1000 tons of each, and discloses just the first two. Its absolute 
disclosure ratio would be 2/3 (0.66). Supposing the environmental damage cost factors for these three indicators 
were $31, $50, and $900 per ton, respectively, the company’s weighted disclosure ratio would be 0.08, calculated as 
(1000*31+1000*50)/(1000*31+1000*50+1000*900). Thus its misrepresentativeness value would be 0.58 (that is, 
0.66-0.08), a high score indicating that the company disproportionately disclosed its less-impactful indicators and 
hid its most-impactful indicators. 13 
 
Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón 1998, Aggarwal and Goodell 2014).
12 In these surveys, business leaders 
were asked, “In your country, how would you assess financial auditing and reporting standards regarding 
company financial performance?” Responses ranged from 1 (“extremely weak”) to 7 (“extremely 
strong”).  
Annual company sales is a common way to capture a company’s visibility to its stakeholders 
(e.g., Hackston and Milne 1996, Patten 2002, Cho and Patten 2007, Elsayed and Hoque 2010). We 
measure sales in millions of U.S. dollars based on data from Worldscope and we standardize by country 
to take into account that the average firm size and the variation in firm size differ substantially by 
country.
13  
We measure the extent to which a company’s activities result in environmental damage using 
estimated values obtained from Trucost, described above, reported in millions of U.S. dollars. As with our 
sales measure, we standardize environmental damage by country to take into account that the average of 
and variation in firm environmental damage differs substantially by country.  
We created a series of dummies to denote each company’s primary industry using the 19 Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB) supersectors based on data from Trucost. For each company, we created 
peer participation as the number of companies sharing the firm’s headquarters country and industry 
classification (ICB supersector) that were already participating in the Global Compact by the prior year.  
We measure a country’s connectedness to the global community as the annual number of 
intergovernmental organizations in which a company’s headquarters country participates, based on data 
from the annual Yearbook of International Organizations.
14 We measure the extent to which each 
company headquarters country’s population generally supports the United Nations and its mission, using 
                                                      
12 We used the 2003 through 2007 Global Competitiveness surveys because we lag all independent variables one 
year. These surveys are available at http://www.weforum.org/issues/global-competitiveness (last accessed May 
2013). 
13 For example, a $500-million-dollar-a-year company in Malaysia is large relative to its peers and will attract more 
scrutiny from its stakeholders than a company in the United States with the same revenues. 
14 The Yearbook of International Organizations is available at http://www.uia.org/yearbook (last accessed August 
2013). We used the 2003 through 2007 editions because we lag all independent and control variables one year. 14 
 
data from the World Values Survey.
15 UN support is the percentage of survey respondents from each 
country that respond “a great deal” or “quite a lot” to the following World Values Survey question: 
“Could you tell me how much confidence you have in [the United Nations]: is it a great deal of 
confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, or none at all?” Because it takes the 
World Values Survey several years to collect the interviews from over 100 countries, the surveys are 
compiled into “waves” which use the same set of survey questions. We use data from the 2005-2008 
survey wave.
16  
We measure the size and economic development of each company's headquarters country by 
obtaining data on annual population and annual GDP per capita from the USDA Economic Research 
Service
17 and take the log of each to reduce skew.  
Summary statistics and correlations are reported in Table 3.   
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
4. Empirical Model  
We estimate the following model: 
  , , ,   F        , ,   	,    , , ,   	,   	,  	,   , , , ) , 
where   , , , 	refers to whether company i in industry j headquartered in country c participated in the 
Global Compact in year t (Global Compact participation). The function F(·) refers to the logistic function 
and the term γ , ,    refers to our key explanatory variables: misrepresentativeness, civil society scrutiny, 
financial reporting standards, and sales.  
                                                      
15 The World Values Survey is available at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV5.jsp (last 
accessed May 2014).  
16 The World Values Survey does not collect data from Hong Kong, Israel, Singapore, and Sri Lanka. Rather than 
drop the observations from these countries, we recode missing values to 0 and included a corresponding 
dichotomous variables coded 1 to denote observations that had been recoded to 0 (Maddala 1977: 202, Greene 2007: 
62). This common econometric approach is algebraically equivalent to recoding missing values with the variable’s 
mean (Greene 2007: 62).  
17 The USDA Economic Research Service’s GDP per capita metric is available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-
products/international-macroeconomic-data-set.aspx (last accessed May 2013). 15 
 
The term   , , ,    refers to several additional factors we control for that might affect a company’s 
decision to participate in the Global Compact. We control for environmental damage because companies 
that pollute more might face more pressure to appease stakeholders and therefore may be more likely to 
join voluntary programs (e.g., Arora and Cason 1995, King and Lenox 2000). We include peer 
participation to account for the possibility that peer pressure (mimetic institutional forces) might 
influence a company’s decision to participate in the Global Compact (Bennie, Bernhagen, and Mitchell 
2007, Perez-Batres, Miller, and Pisani 2011). We also control for the annual number of intergovernmental 
organizations in each company’s headquarters country because countries that are more connected to the 
global community tend to have stronger support for corporate social responsibility norms, including those 
embodied in the Global Compact (Berliner and Prakash 2012, Lim and Tsutsui 2012). Consistent with 
Berliner and Prakash (2012), we control for a country’s size and the scale of its economy by including 
population and annual GDP per capita, respectively.  
The term    represents industry dummies (ICB supersector) to control for time-invariant industry 
differences in the propensity to participate in the Global Compact. Year dummies (  ) control for overall 
temporal trends that might affect participation, such as the Global Compact becoming more recognizable 
over time.   
5. Results  
We estimate our models using logistic regression. Because our model predicts a company’s 
decision to initially participate in the Global Compact, we omit from the sample participants’ 
observations in the years after they joined. We lag all independent variables, moderators, and control 
variables by one year to avoid reverse causality concerns. To ease interpretation, all interacted variables 
are standardized, sales and environmental damage are standardized by country, as noted above. Because 16 
 
several of our variables are measured at the country level, we report heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered by country.
18   
Results are reported in Table 4. Focusing first on the control variables from our primary model 
(Model 1), the significant positive coefficient on sales (β = 0.26; p < 0.01) suggests that less visibility 
discourages joining, which is consistent with prior research finding larger firms more likely to participate 
in commit-and-report programs (Bennie, Bernhagen, and Mitchell 2007).  We also find that companies 
with more environmental damage are significantly more likely to participate in the Global Compact (β = 
0.20; p < 0.01), a finding consistent with prior research on commit-and-report program participation 
(King and Lenox 2000). Companies headquartered in countries with more intergovernmental 
organizations are significantly more likely to participate in the Global Compact (β = 0.48; p < 0.01), a 
finding in accordance with Berliner and Prakash’s (2012) country-level analysis. Peer participation is a 
significant positive predictor (β = 0.05; p < 0.01), suggesting that mimetic pressure might encourage 
companies to participate. Point estimates of the coefficient on GDP per capita are negative in all of our 
models, suggesting that firms headquartered in poor countries are more likely to participate, but the 
relationship is not consistently significant. We find no evidence that UN support or population 
significantly influence companies’ decisions to participate. 
[Insert Table 4 and Figure 1 about here] 
Turning to our hypothesized variables, our results indicate that companies exhibiting greater 
misrepresentativeness in their disclosures are significantly less likely to participate in the Global Compact 
(Model 1: β = -0.39; p < 0.01), lending support to H1. The average marginal effect indicates that a one-
standard-deviation increase in misrepresentativeness corresponds to a 25% decrease in the probability of 
participation in the Global Compact from the 1.74% baseline probability to 1.13%. 
                                                      
18 As a robustness test, we run a hierarchical model (also known as a mixed logistic regression) with companies 
nested within countries. This yields results similar to those of our primary model (in terms of effect sizes and 
significance levels) with the exception that the coefficient on the interaction between misrepresentativeness and civil 
society scrutiny (H2) is significant at the 5% level in the pooled logistic regression, but only significant at the 10% 
level in the hierarchical model.  17 
 
The negative significant coefficient on the interaction between misrepresentativeness and civil 
society scrutiny in Model 2 (β = -0.14; p < 0.05) supports our hypothesis that misrepresentativeness is an 
especially strong deterrent from participation among companies headquartered in countries with more 
civil society engagement in the Global Compact (H2). The lines in Figure 1 depict the average predicted 
probability of participating in the Global Compact along varying levels of misrepresentativeness for 
countries with low versus high civil society scrutiny. Specifically, the solid line refers to the fifth 
percentile of our sample countries’ average civil society scrutiny (that is, no civil society organizations 
participating in the Global Compact) and the dashed line refers to the 95th percentile (that is, eight civil 
society organizations participating in the Global Compact). Both lines slope downwards, indicating a 
consistent negative relationship irrespective of the number of civil society members in the Global 
Compact, but the significant interaction term in Model 2 indicates that the negative relationship is 
significantly more pronounced (steeper) for companies in countries with more civil society members in 
the Global Compact. 
The significant negative coefficient on the interaction between misrepresentativeness and 
financial reporting standards in Model 3 (β = -0.14; p < 0.05) indicates that companies with 
misrepresentative disclosures are especially deterred from participating in the Global Compact in 
countries with stronger reporting standards, which supports H3. The dashed line in Figure 2 represents the 
average predicted probability of participation for companies headquartered in countries with very strong 
financial reporting standards (the 95th percentile in our sample corresponds to companies with 
headquarters in the United Kingdom). The negative slope of this line indicates that for these companies, 
there is a negative relationship between misrepresentativeness and the probability of participating in the 
Global Compact. The nearly flat solid line indicates that for companies headquartered in countries with 
very weak financial reporting standards (the fifth percentile corresponds to companies with headquarters 
in China or Russia), there appears to be no relationship between misrepresentativeness and the probability 
of participating.  
[Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here] 18 
 
The positive significant coefficient on the interaction between misrepresentativeness and sales (β 
= 0.12; p < 0. 01) in Model 4 yields support for H4. This indicates that misrepresentativeness is an 
especially strong deterrent to Global Compact participation for less visible companies. The solid line in 
Figure 3 depicts the average predicted probability of participating in the Global Compact along varying 
levels of misrepresentativeness for low-visibility companies (sales at the fifth percentile in a country). 
The dashed line refers to high-visibility companies (sales at the 95th percentile in a country). The 
significant interaction term indicates that the negative relationship between misrepresentativeness and 
participation is more pronounced (steeper) for less-visible companies than for more-visible companies.  
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
We find that companies that had previously made misrepresentative disclosures are deterred from 
joining a commit-and-report program. We attribute this effect to the heightened stakeholder scrutiny 
which may be brought on by joining, a serious risk for companies that have already made 
misrepresentative disclosures. This explanation is further supported by our finding that factors that 
enhance the impact of stakeholder scrutiny further diminish the likelihood that such companies join.  
6.1 Contributions 
Prior research indicates that buyers can use voluntary programs as a screening mechanism to 
identify suppliers that have implemented a particular set of labor or environmental management practices 
as long as those programs include independent verification audits (Potoski and Prakash 2005), but not 
when the programs lack explicit sanctions (King and Lenox 2000). More recent work has revealed that 
programs that lack such audits and sanctions—but instead convey the implicit threat of inspection by a 
regulator—can also serve as a reliable screening mechanism (Short and Toffel 2010). Our study reveals 
certain circumstances under which voluntary programs that lack all of these conditions—independent 
verification audits, explicit sanctions, and implicit regulatory penalties—can nonetheless serve as a 
reliable screening mechanism. In doing so, we reveal a critical role for stakeholder scrutiny to support the 
credibility of a supplier screening mechanism.  19 
 
Our work also extends the literature on information sharing in supply chains. This literature has 
primarily focused on the value created by information sharing among supply chain partners (Cachon and 
Fisher 2000, Özer, Zheng, and Chen 2011, Kurtulus, Ülkü, and Toktay 2012) and the conditions under 
which buyers and suppliers share operational metrics (Li 2002, Li and Lin 2006, Li and Zhang 2008, 
Özer, Zheng, and Chen 2011) and environmental-risk and risk-management efforts (Jira and Toffel 2013). 
Prior work has found supply chain partners to be more likely to share information—and to share higher-
quality information—when the relationship is characterized by trust, a shared vision, and a commitment 
to keeping the information confidential (Li 2002, Li and Lin 2006, Li and Zhang 2008, Özer, Zheng, and 
Chen 2011). Our research reveals several circumstances under which buyers can be more confident that 
the disclosed information is representative of the supplier’s environmental performance. This allows 
buyers to be more effective at screening suppliers, assessing the full expected economic cost of sourcing 
from a supplier, and managing brand risk.  
Our work also relates to the literature that examines companies’ public reporting of information 
about their labor or environmental performance, which has implications beyond supply chain 
management. This literature has found more reporting from larger and more profitable firms and from 
firms more dependent on capital markets and foreign sales (Patten 1991, Cormier and Magnan 2003, 
Stanny and Ely 2008). A few studies have focused on selective disclosure, where firms reveal the more 
benign aspects of their labor or environmental performance while cloaking the more harmful aspects 
(Lyon and Maxwell 2011, Marquis and Toffel 2014). These studies suggest that companies with worse 
environmental performance—especially when subjected to more scrutiny from civil society—are more 
likely to disclose representative information. While this literature on corporate sustainability reporting has 
identified some antecedents of greater transparency and, to a lesser degree, antecedents of the 
representativeness of environmental disclosure, it has provided little guidance on how buyers and other 
stakeholders can identify companies that make representative disclosures. We begin to fill this gap by 
identifying several circumstances under which participation in a commit-and-report program indicates 
more representative disclosures, and can thus enhance buyers’ efforts to screen suppliers. 20 
 
6.2 Limitations and future research  
Our work has several limitations. While commit-and-report programs require both public 
commitments to the program’s principles and public progress reports, they differ in several ways that call 
into question the generalizability of our results to all such programs. For example, some including the 
Global Compact seek participants from all industries, but others such as the ski industry’s Sustainable 
Slopes program focus on a specific industry. Programs also differ based on whether they are operated by a 
multigovernment agency, a regulator, an industry association, or a consortium. The Global Compact is a 
particularly large, well-known commit-and-report program launched and operated by an unusually 
prominent organization and has attracted considerable criticism from researchers, the media, and activists 
(e.g., Bigge 2004, Nolan 2005, Deva 2006, Waddock and McIntosh 2011). Moreover, some commit-and-
report programs such as the Global Compact are open to all participants irrespective of their prior 
performance, whereas others such as EPA’s Performance Track and similar state programs require 
participants to exceed a pre-existing minimum performance threshold. Because programs with pre-
existing performance thresholds might elicit less stakeholder scrutiny, future research is needed to 
examine whether they also provide a useful screening mechanism. All of these differences highlight the 
need for additional research to determine whether the relationships we uncovered vary by the 
characteristics of commit-and-report programs. 
Another question of generalizability arises from our analysis. Data constraints led us to analyze 
relatively large, publicly listed companies, whereas many voluntary programs also attract small and/or 
privately held companies. Privately held companies are not subject to pressure from public investors or 
socially-responsible-investment rating agencies, which are important sources of institutional pressure. 
Upon joining commit-and-report programs, such companies might not experience an increase in overall 
stakeholder scrutiny that activates the screening mechanism we find for public companies.  
In terms of firm size, we do find that smaller companies with misrepresentative disclosures are 
especially deterred from joining a commit-and-report program, which we attribute to smaller firms facing 
an especially acute risk of increased visibility upon joining. This suggests that our results may well apply 21 
 
to even smaller companies that we could not include in our analysis. Very small companies, however, 
may attract no additional scrutiny at all upon joining a commit-and-report program, which would imply 
that our results might not apply to them. Future research is needed to know how big a company needs to 
be to incur a threat of scrutiny after joining a commit-and-report program.  
Constraints on data availability also confined us to environmental disclosures, although the 
Global Compact is also concerned with human rights, labor, and corruption issues. While companies’ 
environmental performance has garnered much attention from buyers, investors, and other stakeholders, 
future work should examine the circumstances under which commit-and-report programs might provide 
useful screening mechanisms for these other aspects of company operations.  
6.3 Conclusion 
Our study aimed to reveal the circumstances under which voluntary programs that lack third-
party certification requirements can still serve as a reliable screening mechanism for buyers. We extend 
theory of signaling and screening mechanisms in supply chains by demonstrating how the “spotlight 
effect” can deter suppliers that have made misrepresentative disclosures from joining a commit-and-report 
program. Our study thus emphasizes how important stakeholder scrutiny is to the credibility of a 
screening mechanism. 
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Table 1. Headquarters Composition of Sample 
 
Country  Firms  Percent    Country Firms  Percent
Australia  103  5.0%   Malaysia 31  1.5%
Austria  11  0.5%   Mexico 10  0.5%
Belgium  10  0.5%   Netherla 29  1.4%
Brazil  23  1.1%   New Zeal 4  0.2%
Canada  88  4.3%   Norway 37  1.8%
Chile  5  0.2%   Pakistan 10  0.5%
China  49  2.4%   Philippines 7  0.3%
Denmark  11  0.5%   Poland 3  0.2%
Finland  26  1.3%   Portugal 4  0.2%
France  27  1.3%   Russia 13  0.6%
Germany  51  2.5%   Singapore 15  0.7%
Greece  10  0.5%   South Africa 16  0.8%
Hong Kong  48  2.4%   South Korea 67  3.3%
Hungary  1  0.1%   Spain 12  0.6%
India  41  2.0%   Sri Lanka 1  0.1%
Indonesia  16  0.8%   Sweden 27  1.3%
Ireland  11  0.5%   Switzerland 22  1.1%
Israel  14  0.7%   Thailand 17  0.8%
Italy  23  1.1%   Turkey 4  0.2%
Japan  288  14.1%   United Kingdom 242  11.9%
Luxembourg  5  0.2%   United States 611  29.9%
          Total 2,043   
          
 
Table 2. Industry Composition of Sample 
 
ICB supersector Firms Percent
Automobiles & Parts 68 3%
Basic Resources 212 10%
Chemicals 138 7%
Construction & Materials 165 8%
Food & Beverage 164 8%
Industrial Goods & Services 431 21%
Oil & Gas 285 14%
Personal & Household Goods 220 11%
Technology 176 9%
Utilities 184 9%
Total 2,043  
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Table 3. Summary Statistics 
 
   Variable  Mean SD  Min  Max  Correlations 
            1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  7.  8.  9.  10.  11. 
1.  Global Compact participation  0.02 0.13 0 1 1.00                     
2.  Misrepresentativeness  -0.15 0.27 -0.94 0.55 -0.09 1.00                   
3.  Civil society scrutiny  3.42 3.78 0 9 -0.05 0.06  1.00                
4.  Financial reporting standards  5.86 0.64 3.48 6.65 -0.04 -0.02  0.49 1.00              
5.  Sales (in US$ thousands)  6,738 16,324 0.01 358,600 0.06 -0.20  0.04 -0.08 1.00            
6.  Environmental damage (in US$ 
millions)  
233 771 0 11,035 0.07 -0.30  0.02 -0.08 0.29 1.00              
7.  Intergovernmental organizations  739 245 64 1,323 0.04 -0.04  0.37 0.43 -0.03 -0.03 1.00            
8.  Peer participation  2.34 4.82 0 55 0.03 0.07  0.24 0.06 0.01 -0.10 0.15 1.00         
9.  UN support   0.48 0.14 0.19 0.85 0.05 -0.06  -0.76 -0.41 -0.02 -0.04 -0.16 -0.13 1.00      
10.  GDP per capita (log)  10.25 0.88 6.40 11.33 -0.03 -0.03  0.37 0.55 0.04 -0.06 0.37 0.04 -0.21 1.00   
11.  Population (log)  18.29 1.36 13.03 20.99 -0.02 0.04  0.50 -0.22 0.11 0.08 -0.08 0.20 -0.35 -0.22 1.00
 
N = 6,593 company-year observations from 2,043 companies. The standardized variables in the regression have a mean of 0, a standard deviation 
of 1, and the following minimum and maximum values: misrepresentativeness (-2.97, 2.60), civil society scrutiny (-0.90, 1.48), financial reporting 
standards (-3.74, 1.24), sales (-1.44, 14.86), environmental damage (-1.85, 10.17), and intergovernmental organizations (-2.76, 2.38).28 
Table 4. Logistic Regression Results 
 
Dependent variable: Global Compact participation 
 
      (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
      Coef.  AME  Coef.  Coef.  Coef. 
H1  Misrepresentativeness †  -0.387** -0.61%  -0.446**  -0.427** -0.430**
      [0.104]     [0.072]  [0.093]  [0.093] 
   Civil society scrutiny †  -0.401  -0.63%  -0.500+  -0.418  -0.382 
      [0.257]     [0.279]  [0.270]  [0.259] 
H2  Misrepresentativeness † × Civil society scrutiny †       -0.135*      
            [0.068]       
   Financial reporting standards †  -0.213  -0.34%  -0.205  -0.264+  -0.208 
      [0.141]     [0.141]  [0.143]  [0.142] 
H3  Misrepresentativeness † × Financial reporting standards †          -0.137*   
            [0.066]    
   Sales ◊  0.255** 0.40%  0.239**  0.241** 0.405**
      [0.066]     [0.066]  [0.065]  [0.067] 
H4  Misrepresentativeness † × Sales ◊             0.122**
                  [0.038] 
   Environmental damage ◊  0.202** 0.32%  0.203**  0.205** 0.220**
      [0.073]     [0.075]  [0.076]  [0.067] 
   Intergovernmental organizations †  0.478** 0.76%  0.475**  0.476** 0.476**
      [0.091]     [0.090]  [0.089]  [0.094] 
   Peer participation  0.050** 0.08%  0.050**  0.050** 0.051**
      [0.018]     [0.019]  [0.018]  [0.019] 
   UN support  0.568  0.90%  0.547  0.564  0.490 
      [0.907]     [0.898]  [0.929]  [0.927] 
   GDP per capita (log)  -0.196+  -0.31%  -0.190+  -0.173  -0.179 
      [0.112]     [0.112]  [0.121]  [0.116] 
   Population (log)  -0.030  -0.05%  -0.027  -0.023  -0.020 
      [0.109]     [0.109]  [0.111]  [0.112] 
                    
   Industry dummies  Yes     Yes  Yes  Yes 
   Year dummies  Yes     Yes  Yes  Yes 
   Observations  6,593     6,593  6,593  6,593 
   Companies  2,043     2,043  2,043  2,043 
   Participants  109     109  109  109 
   Countries  42     42  42  42 
  
Logistic regression coefficients and average marginal effects (AME) with standard errors clustered by country in 
brackets. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10.  † indicates variables that are standardized and ◊ indicates variables 
standardized by country. All models also include year dummies, industry dummies, and a dummy variable denoting 
instances in which UN support was coded to 0 to replace missing values.  
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Figure 1. Companies with misrepresentative disclosures are especially deterred from joining the Global 
Compact when headquartered in countries with high civil society scrutiny.  
   
The solid line represents low civil society scrutiny, corresponding to the fifth percentile of our sample 
countries’ average civil society scrutiny (that is, no civil society organizations participating in the Global 
Compact). The dashed line represents high civil society scrutiny, corresponding to the 95th percentile 
(that is, eight civil society organizations participating in the Global Compact). 
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Figure 2. Companies with misrepresentative disclosures are especially deterred from joining the Global 
Compact when headquartered in countries with strong financial reporting institutions.  
 
   
The solid line represents weak financial reporting standards; it corresponding to the fifth percentile of 
our sample countries’ average financial reporting standards (that is, at the level of companies with 
headquarters in either China or Russia). The dashed line represents strong financial reporting standards, 
corresponding to the 95th percentile in our sample (that is, at the level of companies with headquarters in 
the United Kingdom).  
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Figure 3. Companies with misrepresentative disclosures that are smaller in size are especially deterred 
from joining the Global Compact. 
 
    
 
The solid line represents smaller firms: those with sales at the fifth percentile in their headquarters 
country. The dashed line represents larger firms: those with sales at the 95th percentile in their 
headquarters country.  
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